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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE PRACTICAL AND
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANASTASOFF
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN*
Judge Richard Arnold's concern that federal circuit rules
precluding citation to unpublished decisions violate the power
accorded the judiciary under Article III to the United States
Constitution' implicates far more than policy considerations
militating for or against publication of a court's decisions.2 It
suggests to the skeptical that there may be something troubling
about the process by which some appellate opinions-the judicial
work product that explains appellate decisions-are deemed less
* © 2001 J. Thomas Sullivan, Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock
School of Law. The author's primary practice experience is in the representation of
criminal defendants on appeal, at trial and in state and federal post-conviction proceedings.
1. Article III of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish....
Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and
citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
[2] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
2. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d
1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Judge Arnold's panel opinion in Anastasoffwas foreshadowed
in an earlier essay. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. App. Prac. &
Process 219 (1999). Judge Arnold commended Professor Martha J. Dragich's article, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to
Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat? 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 757 (1995),
in his essay. Arnold, supra, at 221 n. 3.
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worthy of reliance than others. The panel opinion casts no
aspersions on the quality of appellate decisionmaking that may be
reflected in non-publication decisions. However, at a point in
history when virtually all judicial decisions can be made readily
available to litigants, counsel, and the public in an online format,
the continuing viability of the non-publication rationale has
obviously lost some force. Of course, publication is not the heart
of the question addressed in Anastasoff v. United States. More
precisely, the issue involves rules that bar litigants from formal
reliance on unpublished dispositions, or "no-citation" rules.3
To the extent that the Anastasoff panel opinion addressed
only the scope of authority granted judges by the United States
Constitution, its rationale would affect only those federal circuits
that have adopted rules proscribing reliance on unpublished
decisions by litigants in their courts.5 State courts would have
presumably remained free6 under the panel reasoning to continue
to use existing rules or to adopt new rules limiting reliance on
unpublished decisions as precedent.
7
3. 223 F.3d at 904 (recognizing that a court may decide that some opinions do not warrant
publication and distinguishing between the publication decision and rules limiting citation). For
an interesting exchange concerning the merits of limiting citation to unpublished opinions, see
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 177 (1999) and
Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A Reply
to Chief Judge Martin, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 2025 (1999).
4. 223 F.3d at 900-04.
5. The circuits are not uniform in their view of the precedential value of unpublished
opinions. See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 251 (2001); 2A
Fed. Proc. § 3:827 (West 2000) (both detailing variation in citation rules in federal circuits).
6. State courts have readily adapted to the regime of unpublished opinions. See e.g. David
M. Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall Not be Cited as Authority": The Emerging Contours
of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 90(i), 24 St. Mary's L.J. 115 (1992); Charles W. Adams
& J. Michael Medina, Recent Developments in Oklahoma Civil Appellate Procedure, 26 Tulsa
L.J. 489 n. I (1991) (cautioning reliance on unpublished orders and opinions mentioned in
article that were without precedential value except in limited circumstances under Oklahoma
rule).
7. Publication and citation practices apparently vary widely among jurisdictions, as the
table published as the Serfass/Cranford research demonstrates. See Serfass & Cranford, supra
n. 5. For example, the flip side of the Anastasoff panel's cautionary language that publication
and citation are not to be confused, might be found in Oklahoma practice. There, even
published opinions of the intermediate Oklahoma Court of Appeals lack precedential authority
until formally adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See e.g. Cimarron Fed. Savings Assn.
v. Jones, 1992 OK 55, 832 P.2d 420, which adopted the opinion of the court of appeals, 1991
OK CIV APP 67, 832 P.2d 426 (holding court of appeals opinion in conflict with prior decision
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The long-term impact of Anastasoff on the
publication/citation debate or on our understanding of the
parameters of the judicial power afforded federal courts by Article
III is not clear. Yet, the panel opinion raises a number of
significant questions about access to and reliance on the work
product of the appellate courts that warrant discussion, irrespective
of the constitutional question the panel opinion addresses.
I. NONPUBLICATION, "No-CITATION" RULES,
AND Loss OF PRECEDENT
Judge Arnold's critique suggests concern that in a legal
system predicated on the application of prior decisions, no-citation
rules effectively deprive appellate decisionmaking of its essential
jurisprudential value. Clearly, whenever a court determines that
not only do some decisions not warrant publication, but that they
may not even be cited as precedent in their unpublished form, the
decision not to publish may have significant consequences.8 It not
only deprives the unpublished decision of its precedential value in
many jurisdictions, but nonpublication may also tend to conceal
the court's position on important questions of law.9
As a practical matter, for individual litigants the
constitutional question addressed by the Anastasoff panel ignores
certain realities of both appellate decisionmaking and appellate
argument. On the one hand, unpublished decisions seem to suffer
in terms of quality in many cases, probably as a consequence of
requiring overruling of prior case). This practice is consistent with current court rule. See Okla.
Sup. Ct. R. 1.200(c)(2) (2000).
8. "The fact that the Court of Appeals' opinion is unpublished is irrelevant.
Nonpublication must not be a convenient means to prevent review. An unpublished opinion
may have a lingering effect in the Circuit and surely is as important to the parties as is a
published opinion." Snith v. U.S., 502 U.S. 1017, 1020n. * (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. An interesting counter-argument is made by George M. Weaver, The Precedential
Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 477 (1988). Weaver argues that the
concern that citizens be afforded an opportunity to "know" the law meant that non-published
opinions should not be regarded as "precedent," because non-publication of binding precedent
deprives "the average person, even through his attorney," of access to the law so that he can
"take it into account in ordering his affairs." Id. at 485-86. He concludes the unpublished
opinions should retain their significance as persuasive authority, rather than as binding
precedent. Id. at 490-93.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
the non-publication decision.'0 On the other, experienced appellate
lawyers will not easily dismiss the suspicion that non-publication
may serve to mask inappropriate personal agendas of appellate
judges. But perhaps most interesting is the fact that the panel
addressed limitation on citation of unpublished dispositions only
from the perspective of the appellate court. A compelling
argument can be made that individual litigants who might
prevail-could they rely on unpublished opinions-will be
deprived of their victories through the operation of "no-citation"
rules. This line of argument suggests that in practice appellate
courts will actually ignore prior decisions, which would otherwise
be controlling but for their status as non-citable, unpublished
opinions. "
A. The Accuracy of the Determination Not to Publish
That publication is not the touchstone for the constitutional
question is clear from the Anastasoff court's rationale because it is
not the publication decision itself that renders the unpublished
decision valueless as precedent for litigants.2 Rather, the court
10. Appellate judges are sensitive to criticism that unpublished opinions suffer from at
least stylistic deficiencies, even in refusing to concede that they may reflect poor
decisionmaking. Tenth Circuit Judge Holloway, dissenting from adoption of a limited
citation rule in her circuit, observed:
[I]t may be suggested that in the rush of our business, we must prepare orders
and judgments which are not written in the form of polished discourses which
we wish to serve as citable opinions. This is the most untenable of the notions
suggested for the no-citation rule. In light of our caseload, we are obviously
driven to entering orders which are not the literary models that we would like to
produce as opinions. Nevertheless, the basic purpose for stating reasons within
an opinion or order should never be forgotten-that the decision must be able to
withstand the scrutiny of analysis, against the record evidence, as to its
soundness under the Constitution and the statutory and decisional law we must
follow, and as to its consistency with our precedents. Our orders and judgments,
like our published opinions, should never be shielded from searching
examination.
Re Rules of U.S. Ct. App. for Tenth Cir., Adopted Nov. 18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir.
1992) (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
II. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d
1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972):
We concede, of course, that any decision is by definition a precedent, and that
we cannot deny litigants and the bar the right to urge upon us what we have
previously done.
12. The panel quite deliberately rejected any suggestion that its decision concerned
publication or the form of publication, or that its holding implicated concern that non-
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was concerned with the constitutional and jurisprudential issues
raised by court rules, including that of the Eighth Circuit,'3 that
unpublished decisions may not be cited as precedent.
Nevertheless, the publication decision is clearly significant to
the overall appellate process. The determination not to publish
suggests a decision by the issuing appellate court that the opinion
is less valuable to the court and future litigants, for whatever
reason, than other opinions that will be published. Therefore,
perhaps most important for evaluation of the merits of the system
where a majority of opinions are not designated for publication is
whether the determination not to publish is correct.' The process
should work. Most courts have addressed the publication decision
by formal rule that includes criteria for determining which
opinions warrant publication.'" The decision to publish itself is
presumably made by judges,16 assisted by staff attorneys and lawclerks, who can be expected to apply the criteria correctly. 7
publication of judicial decisions resulted in a secretive process. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904. In
fact, the court observed: "Indeed, most appellate courts now make their opinions, whether
labeled 'published' or not, available to anyone on line. This is true of our Court." Id. The
panel's attempt to distance the citation and publication policies, however, betrays a core truth:
Once opinions are readily available from a court, part of the rationale for limiting citation to
them-lack of general access is removed.
13. 8th Cir. R. 28A(i). The Anastasoff panel held unconstitutional that portion of the rule
which provides that "[u]npublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not
cite them." 223 F.3d at 899.
14. Typically, non-publication practices have been linked to increased appellate filings,
as the Fourth Circuit has explained:
Judge Haynesworth's report to the Federal Judicial Center demonstrates, we
think, the compelling necessity for some abbreviation of normal procedures in
the disposition of appeals that have now increased to 1,405 filed in fiscal year
1972, with a predictable rise in the years ahead. We believe that our screening
procedures and disposition by unreported memorandum decisions accords with
due process and our duty as Article 3 judges, but we confess its imperfection.
Jones, 465 F.2d at 1093-94.
15. See Serfass & Cranford, supra n. 5, for comprehensive review of publication rules.
16. This assumption is not without some doubt, particularly as to the precise role played by
judges, as opposed to staff counsel and law clerks. See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the
Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 940, 953-54 (1989):
In fact, there is some reason to doubt whether judges have much to do with the
publication decision in these areas [review of agency determinations in
immigration and social security, Federal Torts Claims Act cases, criminal and
habeas appeals, civil rights actions, and employment discrimination complaints
against the federal government]. First, judges themselves do not usually do the
initial screening that designates a case as a likely candidate for disposition
without argument. That initial decision is made by staff, usually staff attorneys
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When the determination not to publish is correctly made, the
court properly assesses the significance and dispositional accuracy
of its unpublished decision. Further review is unlikely precisely
because the intermediate court authoring an unpublished decision
has applied routine reasoning to unremarkable issues that should
not warrant formal dissemination. In fact, however, unpublished
decisions are reviewed and reversed. For example, in Hughes v.
Rowe, 9 the Supreme Court, per curiam, granted relief in part,
noting:
The Court of Appeals disposed of the novel question
presented by petitioner by affirming the fee award (taxing
$400 in costs against inmate for filing frivolous civil rights
action) in an unpublished order."'
or a circuit executive.... Some of the screening procedures used by the circuits
identify entire categories of cases by subject matter as likely candidates for the
expedited review that results in nonpublication. This suggests another reason
why nonpublication may not be a good indication of the information value of an
opinion: Decisions that result in nonpublication have been made in gross rather
than individually, at least on the initial level, and judges have few incentives to
examine these initial decisions closely. Existing data reveal that judges rarely
disagree with the initial decision to decide an appeal on the briefs alone. This
means that staff determinations about the relative merits of the cases almost
always prevail, and as noted above, staff determinations may be guided largely
by the subject matter of the opinion."
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See Stephen H. Washy, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals:
Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 325 (2001) (note especially Parts B
and C).
18. See Andrew M. Low's humorous, but thoughtful, essay, Certworthy, 24 Colo. Law.
271 (1995), depicting a retirement party conversation between a young associate and a
professor of appellate practice at the local law school. The associate is concerned that opposing
counsel's certiorari petition will be granted when his client benefited from what he perceived to
be an incorrect ruling by the court of appeals. After characterizing the difference between an
unpublished and published decision of the intermediate court as the same as that "between
night and day," the professor is asked by the associate if he should assert the fact that the court
did not publish the decision as grounds for denial of the cert petition.
"'No, no, certainly not," Stevens said, waving his hands. 'You will mention that the
decision below was unpublished. The Supreme Court knows the significance of that fact
without your assistance."' Id. at 272. Stevens then proceeds to lecture the younger lawyer
that the odds of certiorari being granted will increase if the lower court acts favorably on a
motion to publish the opinion.
Low's perception is shared by many practitioners as well, and undoubtedly, admitted by
many judges, if only privately. Yet, when courts do review lower courts' decisions rendered
without publication of the opinion, the reviewing court often seems to consider it important to
note the non-publication decision.
19. 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
20. Id. at 6-7.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON CONSEQUENCES OF ANASTASOFF 431
The Court proceeded to consider the Seventh Circuit rule for
publication2 ' and noted:
Although petitioner's appeal was decided in an unpublished
order purportedly having no precedential significance, three
members of the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Fairchild
and Judges Swygert and Bauer, nonetheless voted to rehear
the case en banc. Judge Swygert filed a written dissent
22
from the order denying the petition for rehearing en banc.
Including this information in the Court's per curiam disposition
suggests its concern that the court below either failed to appreciate
the significance of its decision or ignored it in deciding not to
publish.
In a similar vein, in his memorandum opinion denying the
petition for writ of certiorari in Taylor v. United States,23 Justice
Stevens noted an apparent lack of consistency in the application of
the Fifth Circuit's publication rule. The circuit court had affirmed
in an unpublished opinion issued two days after a published
opinion in another case reached a different conclusion. Petitioner
Taylor's case had not been designated for publication based on the
circuit rule that permits nonpublication of "opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis
of well-settled principles of law."24 Justice Stevens concluded that
there existed "a conflict within the Fifth Circuit on both the
answer and the importance of the question" presented.25
Theoretical support for nonpublication and no-citation
policies must rest on the assumption that appellate courts are able
to accurately assess what dispositions warrant publication and
precedential value. When appellate courts err in this regard,
confidence in the work of the appellate bench is undermined. The
problem is accentuated when counsel and litigants are able to
access judicial work product in the form of unpublished opinions
through online services or judicial Web sites, but are unable to rely
21. Id. at 7 n. 3. The Court observed, "Rule 35(c)(1) of the Circuit Rules of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit identifies those decisions warranting
publication: A published decision will be filed when the decision ... (i) establishes a new, or
changes an existing, rule of law." Id.
22. Id. at 7.
23. 493 U.S. 906, 110 S. Ct. 265 (1989) (table).
24. 110 S. Ct. at 265 (citing 5th Cir. Ct. App. R. 47.5).
25. Id.
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on a court's prior decisions in predicting outcomes or fashioning
appellate arguments.
B. The Impact of Loss of Precedent on Individual Litigants
The Anastasoff panel opinion does not take into consideration
the impact of the no-citation rule on the individual litigant, except
by implication. For at least some litigants, loss of a prior holding
as precedent significantly disadvantages their likelihood of
obtaining a favorable holding on appeal.2
This resulting disadvantage suggests additional constitutional
issues that might be raised both in state and federal court. State
court litigants could presumably challenge no-citation rules
limiting reliance on otherwise favorable prior judicial holdings on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The question might be framed in
terms of a due process issue similar to that raised in Fiore v.
White.27 In holding that state courts were bound to apply existing
principles of state law to pending appeals, the Court suggested that
certain aspects of state appellate process be governed by due
process guarantees." The suggestion that a litigant's inability to
rely on favorable prior decisions is not new. In her dissent from
the adoption of a circuit rule limiting citation to unpublished
opinions in the Tenth Circuit, then-Chief Judge Holloway argued:
No matter how insignificant a prior ruling might appear to
us, any litigant who can point to a prior decision of the
court and demonstrate that he is entitled to prevail under it
should be able to do so as a matter of essential justice and
fundamental fairness. To deny a litigant this right may well
have the overtones of a constitutional infringement because
26. Some commentators argue that non-citation rules compromise the individual litigant's
right to petition the courts for redress of grievances. See Salem M. Katsh and Alex V.
Chachkes, Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 287 (2001).
27. 531 U.S. 225 (2001), rev'g, 149 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (in which the circuit court
held that "state courts are under no constitutional obligation to apply their decisions
retroactively").
28. Id. at 228-29 (holding that Pennsylvania was required to apply its law as
previously interpreted ).
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of the arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal treatment of
the rule.29
Judge Holloway observed that on two occasions the United
States Supreme Court had apparently declined to rule on
challenges to the constitutionality of no-citation rules in force in
other circuits. 30 She concluded that if the court were aware that an
issue would be controlled by a prior, unpublished decision, the
court would have a "duty, as a matter of basic justice" to rely on it
and that "logic would demand citing the earlier ruling." 3
Alternatively, consider the Court's interesting reliance on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to justify
intervention in Florida's state electoral process in Bush v. Gore.32
A state litigant might argue successfully that denial of access to an
unpublished opinion as binding precedent due to a state's no-
citation rule would deny the litigant or class of litigants equal
protection by frustrating their opportunity to assert unpublished
"authority" as authority.33
Not only does the limitation on citation and access to prior
decisions frustrate the expectations of individual litigants and their
counsel on appeal, but it retards the development of the law.
Often, nonpublication may shield an appellate court from a
general appreciation of its reasoning or approach to a particular
problem or issue.
An example of this problem is presented by the unpublished
decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Reed v. State.3
On direct appeal, Reed had asserted a number of claims similar to
29. Re Tenth Cir. Rules, 955 F.2d at 37 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting). The dissenting
opinion of then-Chief Judge Holloway, joined by circuit Judges Barrett and Baldock, was
published six years after the adoption of the rule.
30. The two cases involved the Seventh Circuit's rule in Do-Right Auto Sales v. U.S.
Ct. App. for Seventh Cir., 429 U.S. 917 (1976), and Bowder v. Director, 111. Dept. of
Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978), rev'g, 534 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1976). The circuit cases
are discussed in William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential
Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1167, 1180 n. 74 (1978).
31. 955 F.2d at 37.
32. 121 S. Ct. 525, 530 (2000).
33. In its treatment of the equal protection claim, the Court in Bush v. Gore did not
articulate what constituted the "class" of voters whose "fight of suffrage" would be denied or
define its parameters, suggesting that any single voter has standing to challenge an election
practice compromising his right to vote.
34. No. 69,292 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 1995).
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those raised in Batson v. Kentucky,35 even though the objections
made at Reed's 1983 trial antedated Batson by three years. Reed
was submitted for decision following oral argument on April 23,
1986; Batson was issued one week later. The court of criminal
appeals did not dispose of the appeal for several years following
argument; it finally remanded the cause for a "retrospective"
Batson hearing in 1992. Following the hearing on the claims, the
court permitted supplemental briefing. In his supplemental brief,
Reed relied on the court's intervening decision in Young v. State,35
which permitted the defendant to advance, for the first time on
direct appeal, a comparative analysis of jurors excluded by the
prosecution through the use of peremptory challenges. The
comparative analysis contrasted the backgrounds and responses of
minority jurors peremptorily challenged against those of
comparable or similarly situated majority jurors accepted by the
prosecution for jury service.37
Despite Young's approval of the procedure, the court refused
to consider Reed's comparative analysis, basing its refusal on
Tompkins v. State,3" which held that a comparative analysis had to
first be presented to the trial court in a capital prosecution."
Critical to Reed's position was the fact that Young regarded the
Tompkins preservation rule as dicta. n Petitioning for rehearing,
Reed asserted due process and equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment. He based these arguments, first, on the
court's application of a less favorable standard for preservation of
error in capital cases, as opposed to non-capital cases, and second,
35. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
36. 826 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). The Young court reviewed
a court of appeals decision holding that trial counsel's failure to advance a comparative analysis
of majority jurors accepted and minority jurors excluded from the trial jury through the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges at the hearing in the trial court essentially waived
reliance on this type of analysis on appeal. The court of criminal appeals reversed.
37. See Yancey v. State, 2001 WL 32834 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2001) (finding disparate
treatment where minority jurors peremptorily challenged for having committed traffic and
misdemeanor offenses, while six majority jurors having similar records were empanelled).
38. 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
39. Reed, No. 69,292, slip op. at 25-27.
40. In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the controlling footnote in Tompkins,
774 S.W.2d at 202-03, n. 6A, in which the court had concluded that failure to first present the
comparative analysis to the trial court precluded its consideration on appeal was "not a holding
of this Court, and we decline to adopt it as one." 826 S.W.2d at 144. The court further
observed, "As is generally true with footnotes, we regard this footnote as dictum even though
we are not in complete disagreement with some of its observations." Id. n. 5.
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on the court's failure to apply Young in pending appellate
litigation. Reed relied on the general principle advanced by the
Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane41 that appellate litigants should
have the benefit of existing precedent in the resolution of their
claims on appeal. The court declined to rehear the case, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.42
Nonpublication of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision only served to obscure the distinction it drew between
precedent authorizing comparative analysis in Batson arguments
raised initially on appeal in non-capital cases and precedent
requiring the analysis to be raised at the trial-court level in capital
prosecutions.4 ' Although the decision is not subject to citation as
precedent, the Attorney General's office is undoubtedly aware of
the holding, while lawyers not having access to the unpublished
decision may not be. The decision was apparently never released
for even online dissemination.
Not only was Reed denied the benefits of Young, but the
reviewing court rejected his arguments in an unpublished decision
that failed to inform other capital defendants' counsel of the need
to preserve error in strict compliance with the prior decision in
Tompkins. The unpublished decision in Reed reflects an appellate
court not only hiding its inaccurate decisionmaking, but also
failing to afford future litigants notice as to exactly what
preservation of error rules would apply in capital, as opposed to
non-capital, cases.
II. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ABANDONING
NONPUBLICATION, No-CITATION POLICIES
Several authors in this issue have argued forcefully for and
against the holding and rationale of the Anastasoff panel, in
examining its support for democratization of judicial
decisionmaking. However, in practice, the panel's approach is
likely to be troubling, particularly in jurisdictions whose citation
rules might be altered to reflect its underlying thesis. The decision
41. 489 U.S. 288, 304-05 (1989).
42. Reed v. Texas, 516 U.S. 1050 (1996).
43. Moreover, the court seems to have basically gotten the decision wrong in light of its
prior rejection of Tompkins as controlling in its intervening decision in Young. See supra
n. 40.
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implicates two important considerations for practitioners that are
not discussed by the symposium authors. First, the reality is that
many decisions not designated for publication provide precious
little in the way of legal reasoning or factual development, which
may guide a subsequent court in relying on the decision as
precedent. Frankly, many are poorly reasoned and superficial in
their treatment of both the facts presented in the case4' and the
applicability of precedent relied on in disposing of the case.
Second, practitioners face an additional problem of access to these
opinions. That problem implicates professional norms governing
effective representation.
For all litigants, nonpublication makes access to the body of
existing case law difficult and more expensive, even if
nonpublication does not limit precedential value within the
jurisdiction. When nonpublication does not correlate with a
prohibition on citation, some litigants will be advantaged by their
ability to locate the unpublished authority. Those who are not able
to access unpublished authority, whether because of lack of
resources for research, counsel's lack of research ability, or just
because of a failure of dumb luck, will be disadvantaged. Changes
in publication practice and no-citation rules affect litigants in one
unquestionable way: Expansion of publication or citation authority
necessarily will increase the volume of judicial opinions which
must be researched in order to properly determine the existence of
controlling authority on a given issue. One of the realities of non-
publication is that this policy places some practical limitations on
research demands for appellate practitioners.45
44. Not uncommonly, litigants or their counsel find factual errors in judicial opinions,
which are sometimes corrected by the appellate court on motion. See e.g. American Community
Servs., Inc. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 1999 WL 239912 (Tex. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (modifying
opinion and issuing corrected judgment to reflect omitted name of an appellant on motion for
rehearing); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 126 S.W. 1200 (Tex. 1910) (correcting factual error
in published opinion on motion to correct filed by defendant in error).
45. The sheer numbers of pages of judicial opinions published annually affect not only
appellate lawyers, but also trial judges and trial lawyers, whose work is shaped by appellate
decisionmaking. See e.g. D. Brock Homby, From the Bench: Appellate Judges: Think Before
You Publish, 22 Litig. 3 (1996). United States District Judge Hornby opened his essay most
cogently: "As one who must consume thousands of appellate opinions each year, I wish to
make some 'quality control' suggestions for this ever-multiplying and potentially hazardous
product." Id. at 3.
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A. The Threat to Litigants Posed by Poorly Reasoned,
Unpublished Opinions
It is difficult to quarrel with so esteemed a jurist as Judge
Richard Arnold. Indeed, if Judge Arnold were personally
responsible for the creation of all judicial opinions, it would solve
a primary concern for practitioners now threatened, at least in the
Eighth Circuit, with the eventual need to consider unpublished
decisions as authority. Regrettably, not all jurists are as skilled and
conscientious as Judge Arnold. The truth is that many unpublished
decisions are delivered in opinions that include neither a careful
discussion of facts nor a sophisticated application of the
controlling authority on which the court relied.
This does not mean that many unpublished decisions reflect
wrongly decided cases, but it does mean that the court issuing the
decision concluded it did not warrant publication. For that reason
alone, the tendency of authoring judges to engage in less rigorous
examination of facts or application of precedent is inherent in the
culling process undertaken for cases warranting general
dissemination.
In areas with large and often increasing numbers of appeals,
such as criminal and workers' compensation matters, a number of
factors may lead to less precision in the disposition of cases
ultimately designated as not for publication. For instance, in
criminal matters, even meritorious claims do not require reversal
unless some degree of prejudice can be shown or inferred, even
under the most generous test of Chapman v. California.4' As a
consequence, many criminal appeals presenting otherwise
colorable or attractive claims are easily rejected because
overwhelming evidence of guilt eventually dooms them,
regardless of their theoretical appeal or the sophistication of
counsel's argument.
The sheer caseload demands placed upon appellate defenders
and the often low compensation offered to appointed counsel also
likely result in less sophistication in the development of argument.
Similarly, many criminal appeals presenting arguable claims must
be affirmed because a failure to preserve error at trial prevents the
46. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring reversal for constitutional error unless error can be
shown to be haniless beyond a reasonable doubt).
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appellate court from reviewing those claims without resorting to
doctrines of plain or fundamental error. To the extent that
unpublished decisions follow poorly preserved or poorly argued
claims, the quality of the appellate opinion expressing rejection of
those claims can hardly fail to be adversely affected by the way in
which the claims have been procedurally defaulted. This suggests
that poor advocacy may well result in a less rigorous review by the
appellate court and that less rigorous review is often concealed by
a determination not to publish the decision.
Counsel faced with researching unpublished decisions, which
would be controlling but for a prohibition against citation to
unpublished authority, are likely to find precious little support for
their clients. Unpublished cases often reflect an almost
mechanistic application of general principles to facts or arguments
that would demand greater analytical precision if the reviewing
court's reasoning were targeted for publication. 47 The beneficiary
of imprecision in precedent is generally the appellee, who enjoys a
strong presumption of regularity in the proceedings below once
the case is reviewed by the appellate court. Moreover, doctrines
such as harmless error,48 application of the abuse of discretion
standard49 and preservation rules that foreclose consideration of
procedurally defaulted claims enhance the position of the appellee
47. The most obvious example lies in the issuance of decisions that provide merely the
notation that the case has been affirmed, a practice criticized by William C. Smith in Big
Objections to Brief Decisions, 85 ABA J. 34 (Aug. 1999). The Eleventh, Third and Eighth
Circuits led the federal circuit courts in the number of decisions disposed of merely by the
notation "Affirmed," with 16.6, 23.4, and 20.9% of cases disposed of summarily by those
circuits, respectively. The percentage of cases disposed of by all federal circuits in such fashion
during 1998 was 6.1%, in contrast to the 68.7% of all cases disposed of during that year by
unpublished opinion. Id. at 36.
48. In civil cases, for example, reversible error typically occurs only when the substantial
interests of a party are implicated by the error. Even in criminal cases, the most rigorous test
faced by appellees is generally the harmless error test of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967), which requires the prosecution to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that
constitutional error contributed to conviction. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that
some error in criminal proceedings, denominated "structural," as opposed to "trial error,"
cannot be remedied without reversal. Arizona v. Fuhninante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991). This
rule of automatic reversal results from the fact that the criminal defendant could never
demonstrate that the error actually prejudiced him. An example of this type of error lies in the
exclusion of a single Witherspoon-qualified juror from service in a capital trial in which the
death penalty is sought. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 122 (1976) (per curiam).
49. See generally Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisioninaking, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 47, 48-49 (2000) (describing the "abuse of
discretion" standard for appellate review).
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in any system of appellate review recognizing those standards of
practice.5°
As a consequence, criminal practitioners are likely to find
few unpublished decisions of significant aid for their clients.5 In
criminal appeals this means that the prosecution's arsenal will be
strengthened significantly once the State or government is
permitted to search not only published, but unpublished, decisions
to find support for the verdict. To the extent that the imprecision
will generate additional affirmances, the overall picture is
somewhat bleaker than the current landscape in "no-citation"
jurisdictions.52
Arguably, the same line of analysis will hold for dispositions
in civil contexts, in which case volume is characterized by a
substantial number of "routine" affirmances. For instance, the
abuse of discretion standard of review results in many affirmances
on issues that might be resolved by reversal, were de novo review
appropriate. These dispositions appear routine because the
controlling question is not the underlying legal question, but
merely whether the initial decisionmaker abused its discretion in
ruling unfavorably to the appellant. The "routine" nature of these
appeals results in unpublished decisions because the disposition,
rather than the underlying legal issue, is, in fact, "routine." Over
the long run, the increasing numbers of unpublished affirmances
will create a body of case law in which similar issues are buried in
50. See Elizabeth M. Horton, Student Author, Selective Publication and the Authority
of Precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1691 (1995):
[H]igh rates of nonpublication may be justified in many of these areas. Many of
these areas (immigration, social security, prisoner petitions, labor and civil
rights) have high rates of frivolous appeals because the benefits to be gained if
the appeal succeeds are so high and disincentives to appeal are so low, especially
when the appellant is not bearing legal fees. Moreover, in sone areas the
standard of review is deferential. Most unpublished dispositions are summary
affirmances of the district court's holding, suggesting that not much new
precedent is being developed.
Id. at 1702 (emphasis added, citations to notes omitted).
5 1. This likelihood is also reflected in the fact that reversals comprise a greater percentage
of published opinions in criminal cases than unpublished opinions. See Michael Hannon, A
Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeal, 3 J. App. Prac. &
Process 199, 218-21 (2001); Washy, supra n. 17, at 338.
52. The practice of affirming without opinion may actually inure to the criminal defense
bar's benefit in some jurisdictions. This judicial tack of convenience has been criticized, supra
n. 47, but in fact, an affirmance without formal opinion may be preferable to a more developed
disposition that will come to serve as precedent.
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the application of the abuse of discretion standard of review.
Appellants will find little favorable precedent in these decisions,
while the court will discover a lengthy history of treatment of
similar issues as "routine." Ironically, in the long run, "no-
citation" rules may actually serve to insulate appellants, along
with the reviewing courts, from the consequences of less rigorous
appellate review.
In the best of all worlds, the most skilled jurist would decide
each case and render an opinion that reflect well on her skills and
does justice. In the world of resource limitations, this is less likely
to happen, as staff attorneys and law clerks decide more cases and
the appellate bench becomes less attractive to lawyers capable of
performing at the highest levels of professional expertise.
B. The Impact on Litigation of Changes in Access
to Unpublished Opinions
The availability of many courts' unpublished opinions in an
online format suggests that arguments citing access problems-
which may justifiably have prompted "no-citation" rules when
only some opinions were deemed to warrant publication in printed
form-have lost their force.53 To a very important extent, this
suggestion is true. Online publication, cost-effective when
compared with distribution of printed texts, does provide broader
access to the work of those courts authorizing online publication
of opinions not otherwise selected for publication. However, it
also suggests additional problems and burdens for counsel.
Most significantly, the elimination of the publish/do-not-
publish distinction in assigning precedential value to the work of
an appellate court means that an attorney must review the entire
body of the court's work. Lawyers would be obliged to research
53. See Robel, supra n. 16, at 945 (citations omitted):
By forbidding citation, the courts hope to conserve the presumed savings of
nonpublication. First, if cases could be cited and therefore would be used by a
wide audience seeking authority, judges might feel compelled to do a better job
writing them, and so the assumed savings in judicial time would be lost. Second,
savings in consumption costs would be lost because litigants would feel the need
to research these opinions, if they could be cited, and publishers would publish
them. Finally, because the courts' distribution rules assure that access to these
opinions will not be uniform, the no-citation rules supposedly insure that those
litigants who have unusually large access to unpublished opinions will have no
incentive to make use of that access in unfair ways.
440.
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unpublished, but available, opinions as well as published opinions
in order to bring appropriate authority to the attention of the
appellate court. Lawyers practicing before courts in which
unpublished opinions may be cited as precedent already bear the
burden of researching those decisions, a burden made doubly hard
because courts may not find themselves duty-bound to make their
unpublished opinions available in a readily researched form. For
example, the Fifth Circuit, which treats unpublished opinions as
theoretically retaining precedential value, does not authorize their
publication by online services.54
In fact, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(3) directs
appellate counsel to provide the court with adverse authority.55
This means, of course, that a lawyer might intentionally fail to
research unpublished opinions in order to insulate himself from
liability for a knowing failure to disclose, although it is unlikely
that lawyers ever really face the prospect of being disciplined for
56failure to disclose adverse authority. However, inclusion of
unpublished authority in the universe of precedent that may bind a
court underscores the need for the attorney to make the relevant
search.
Of course, the same ethical rules should work to the
advantage of counsel operating in less well-organized or well-
funded contexts because opposing counsel will also be under a
duty to research and disclose adverse precedent to the court. To
the extent that unpublished decisions rest on applications of
general principles to factually imprecise recitations of key facts,
however, it will be easier for counsel to conclude that apparently
54. 5th Cir. R. 47.6; see Hannon, supra n. 51, at 211, 222. This represents a substantial
research problem, particularly for non-institutional litigants who may not have access to
databases created by accumulation of unpublished printed opinions over time.
55. "A lawyer shall not knowingly.., fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." ABA Model R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3).
56. Appellate courts are more likely to simply discount advocacy that reflects a failure to
disclose controlling authority, or to use oral argument as an occasion to upbraid offending
counsel, rather than to refer the matter to a disciplinary committee. Counsel's error may be
unintentional, or at best, negligent, which would not necessarily justify sanction. Alternatively,
a reviewing body comprised of practitioners and laypersons might find the violation trivial in
comparison to an opinion expressed by an appellate panel. Given the sheer volume of
precedent in some jurisdictions, failure to find and cite clearly appropriate controlling authority
might nevertheless be viewed as an omission, rather than the type of action warranting
discipline.
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adverse authority is actually distinguishable and not controlling.
Thus, the ethical rule compelling disclosure may prove ineffective
in guaranteeing faithful adherence to unpublished precedent in the
argument of cases, even if an appellate court attempts to ensure
correct application of unpublished authority in the resolution of
claims.
What is more troubling, however, is that searching the
universe of case law is now more time consuming and more
expensive, because the attorney risks an ineffectiveness claim if
she fails to locate favorable unpublished authority that would have
made a difference in the disposition of the client's case. This is
particularly burdensome for the often under-compensated court-
appointed attorney. Yet compensation rates do not always cover
the costs of online research, even when that research is relatively
inexpensive. Moreover, the time spent searching for unpublished
authority when published authority would otherwise appear
dispositive, or at least highly supportive, is probably not time that
will be compensated in the average case, if only because of fiscal
limitations placed on compensation schemes.
For attorneys operating with the benefit of research
capabilities provided by an employer, this research obligation will
increase the time involved for investigating authority for each case
handled, but perhaps not markedly. Nevertheless, the real problem
for many appellants' counsel in criminal cases lies in the fact that
the universe of unpublished decisions typically reflects an even
higher percentage of affirmances than the universe of all
dispositions. Reversals, almost by definition, occur when a major
flaw in the proceedings has produced prejudice sufficient to
warrant relief. Those cases will usually involve the types of issues
and application-of-law scenarios that are implicit in notions of
publication-worthiness. So for some litigants, expanding citation
options to include unpublished decisions will not result in
advantages in arguing claims. It will, however, likely necessitate
greater resources being expended by counsel searching for
precedent that will not likely result in favorable results.
The access problem suggests a series of questions that should
be addressed before a judicial rush to unwind long-standing
precedent and citation rules occurs.
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1. Retroactive and Prospective Application of
New Citation Principles
There already exists in many jurisdictions a substantial body
of unpublished decisions that cannot be readily accessed. Many
unpublished decisions predate online research vehicles; others
were either never published in online format or have been
withdrawn. Altering the universe of precedent to include
previously issued unpublished opinions poses theoretical problems
when an appropriate database does not exist for reliable research.
For example, if the rule change contemplates reliance on
previously issued, unpublished opinions, how can counsel and the
courts protect against selective use of newly issued, favorable
precedent that would be less compelling if weighed against
previously issued unfavorable precedent that may not be generally
available? Absent access to a comprehensive database, neither the
parties nor the court can protect against selectivity in designation
of precedent or injustice in the individual case because the parties
and the court may be unable to use precedent that would have
been controlling if found and cited.
On the other hand, prospective application of the rule might
appear to solve this problem at first blush, while offering some
other benefits. For instance, prospective application notifies judges
and supporting legal staff that precision cannot be sacrificed in any
disposition simply because the supporting opinion will not be
published and, thus, open to public scrutiny. Additionally,
prospective operation of the rule will necessarily press for the
creation of new databases which are permanent and
comprehensive, avoiding the problem of selective reliance on
unpublished precedent not readily available to counsel or the court
in an accessible format.
To the extent that appellate courts are able to reconstruct
comprehensive databases from records of unpublished decisions,
they may be obligated, by abandonment of a "no-citation" rule, to
create such databases and make them available to researchers in at
least an online format. The use of court web sites could
accomplish this, although not without some substantial cost for the
initial entry of data. Similarly, the databases created could simply
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be made available to online research vehicles for incorporation
into existing databases.57
Designating a rule change in this area as prospective-only
also raises another issue. Judge Arnold's thesis is essentially that
all pronouncements of law by federal courts constitute the "law"
upon which future litigants may rely. If that is true, how can
judicial rulemaking discard previously unpublished cases from
citation and reliance questions? If the appellate courts are violating
the terms of the authority delegated to them under the Constitution
by designating some decisions as nonprecedential, how can a court
constitutionally adopt a rule of prospective application, yet
continue to deprive prior unpublished decisions of precedential
authority?
2. Disparity in Access to Unpublished Opinions
Resource disparity is almost inherent in many areas of
appellate practice. Large appellate offices, typically those of
attorneys general or public agencies, enjoy an advantage over
smaller offices and solo practitioners in terms of resources
available for practice." Even when fiscal resources are roughly
57. At that point, would the typical disclaimer disappear because there would be no point in
denoting those decisions that had been labeled "Do not publish?" Or would prior designation
of an opinion as unpublished supply another layer of strength to the hierarchy of authority as
controlling or persuasive? In other words, would a previously unpublished decision carry the
same precedential weight as a published decision? Should an unpublished decision of one
circuit be viewed as having the same precedential weight as a published decision of another?
Judge Arnold suggested this point in his earlier essay in The Journal. He noted that the Fifth
Circuit relied on an unpublished decision of the Eighth Circuit in U.S. v. Kocourek, 116 F.3d
481 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (table), to decide U.S. v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999).
Arnold, supra n. I, at 220-21. The irony lies in the fact that within the Eighth Circuit, citation to
Kocourek would have arguably violated the "no-citation" rule. 8th Cir. R. 28A(i) (adopted as
of Dec. 8, 1994). In a similar vein, when the Eighth Circuit, en banc, vacated the initial panel
decision in Anastasoff, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000), it observed the conflict between its
prior, unpublished decision in Christie v. U.S., No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per
curiam) (unpublished), and a published holding of the Second Circuit, Weisbart v. U.S., 222
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2000), issued while Anastasoff was pending before the panel. The panel had
concluded that it could not overrule a prior decision of the circuit based on authority from
another circuit, and the panel opinion reflected no definitive statement of the relative merits of
the two holdings. 223 F.3d at 905 n. 15.
58. See Horton, supra n. 50, at 1701 (arguing that criticism that repeat litigants would
be advantaged by greater access to unpublished opinions over "one-shot" litigants has
been rendered less legitimate by access to unpublished opinions on computer systems and
publication of some unpublished opinions in administrative agency reports and
newsletters). But this view presupposes that access to all unpublished opinions in online
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comparable, a factor that occurs when attorney caseloads in large
offices are such that time available for any single appeal
compromises representation ability of individual attorneys within
the office, the larger appellate office still enjoys certain benefits
that accumulate over time in practice.5 9 Collegiality alone is a
significant factor in appellate practice, but apart from the
opportunity to share ideas with colleagues, the actual benefits of
shared litigation experience are likely to include generation of
important data or databases that will be available for argument in
cases presenting common issues. These concerns are not
implicated by Judge Arnold's reasoning, of course, but they
suggest the substantial advantages that accumulated experience,
including experience in individual cases resolved with
unpublished decisions, offers from practice in a large office
handling a volume of appeals in a common area of law.6°
Moreover, bodies of unpublished case law may exist in forms
that would permit large appellate offices, typically public
agencies, to create new databases by manual searching of case
files that were concluded with unpublished decisions. This would
permit the creation of a database accessible by one office, typically
representing a governmental entity,6' but not generally available to
opposing counsel. Of course, the database might be characterized
as a public document available for disclosure to opposing
format is available, which is not yet correct. And selective publication of some unpublished
opinions in specialized reporters necessarily means that legal editors, not the courts, are
determining which opinions should be made generally available.
59. Other commentators have suggested that institutional litigants have certain distinct
advantages in the publication process by virtue of their involvement in large numbers of cases.
See Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent.- Selective Publication,
Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 109, 130-31 (1995) (also
noting the institutional litigants have better access to the information contained in unpublished
opinions); Robel, supra n. 16, at 956-57 (concluding that institutional litigants, particularly
government units, are able to rely on reasoning and citations to authority in unpublished
opinions to develop arguments in future cases).
. 60. Indeed the New Mexico rule prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions
recognizes this very problem:
An opinion, decision, or memorandum opinion, because it is unreported and not
uniformly available to all parties, shall not be published nor shall it be cited as
precedent in any court.
N.M. R. App. P. 12-405(C) (emphasis added).
61. This likelihood is suggested by Charles G. Mills, Anastasoff v. United States and
Appeals in Veterans' Cases, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 419 (2001) (discussing veterans'
disability appeals).
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counsel,62 even though a strong argument could be made that the
creation of the database itself constituted the work product of the
appellate office. As work product, the database might not be
subject to disclosure, just as prosecutors' records of prior jury
service of citizens used to assist trial counsel in making
peremptory challenges are typically not subject to disclosure to the
defense. Further, the database might be created selectively, so that
only affirmances would be included. Because the available
database would not contain reversals, it would likely not include
prior unpublished "precedent" contrary to the general interests of
the agency's principal client(s). Individual attorneys within the
office would be excused from ethical sanction based upon failure
to provide contrary authority because the database searched would
not, itself, be designed to include decisions resolved contrary to
the client's interests. In this event, the disclosed database would be
of little use to opposing counsel.
Finally, the most critical immediate problem would appear to
be that private providers of case information do not necessarily
include all unpublished decisions in their electronic databases.
Thus, Westlaw, for example, determines which unpublished
opinions will be included in its online database for access by
users.63 Ultimately, this means that West Publishing Company
editors, rather than appellate courts, would determine the scope of
existing 6recedent that may appropriately be relied upon by
litigants. The only alternative to privatization of precedent
determination will be the creation and maintenance of publicly
accessible databases of all published opinions by appellate courts
62. See e.g. Deborah Leonard Parker, Electronic Filing in North Carolina: Using the
Internet instead of the Interstate, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 351, 358-59 (2000) (noting that
both the North Carolina Attorney General's Appellate Division and the state's Office of
Appellate Defender now access opposing briefs through the "brief bank" created by the state's
e-filing system for appeals). Another commentator suggests that "[a]ccess can also be
equalized through discovery requests to institutional litigants for copies of the dispositions
(whether published or unpublished) of cases in which they were involved over the same
issues." Horton, supra n. 50, at 1701.
63. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 71, 98 n. 165 (1999) (noting that Westlaw does not contain all
unpublished opinions from circuits permitting online publication, but selects cases on
individual merits for inclusion on its electronic database).
64. For a compelling look at the magnitude of problems associated with researching
unpublished opinions, see Hannon, supra n. 5 I.
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or jurisdictions." Even then, there may be legitimate concerns that
databases could be tampered with by digital invasion, suggesting
an interesting ultra vires parallel to the process of depublication,
by which existing precedent in some jurisdictions is now
retroactively stripped of its precedential value.66
3. The Impact on the Tradition of Printed Opinions
The access argument may proceed on the assumption that
online access to a court's decisions represents the only
consideration for publication/citation rules. Once online
publication makes the entire body of a court's work available to
legal researchers and the public, future litigants' interests are only
frustrated by inclusion of notations in an online document
indicating that the decision may not be cited as precedent in future
cases. In a real sense, the "not for publication" notation teases
counsel with the prospect that a similar rationale will be available
in a factually similar case to afford relief for the client, yet the
question of whether the court will really reach that conclusion
remains. The online availability of an opinion denoted "not for
publication" undermines the concept integral to the no-citation
rule, that the court itself has determined that the opinion does not
warrant reliance as precedent or that its precedential value is
limited to application of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of
the case doctrines. Of course, unless there is something
fundamentally flawed in the opinion or disposition ordered by the
court, there is no justification for designating the decision as a
65. Judge Holloway suggested the creation of a public database in her dissent to the
adoption of the Tenth Circuit's "no-citation" rule:
We can make the rulings, together with a simple index, available at our circuit
library and can distribute the rulings to the clerks of the district courts, to the
state bar associations, and to other depositories at law schools, without undue
burden. Making the rulings available in such places, with a rudimentary index,
will afford the public, and bar and the district judges reasonable access to our
unpublished rulings.
955 F.2d at 37-38. Of course, the more feasible approach, with fifteen years of hindsight, is
to publish all rulings online.
66. See Michael A. Berch, Analysis of Arizona's Depublication Rule and Practice, 32 Ariz.
St. L.J. 175 (2000); Steven B. Katz, California's Curious Practice of "Pocket Review," 3 J.
App. Prac. & Process 385 (2001) (both articles discussing depublication of previously issued
opinions in their respective jurisdictions).
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second-class product not eligible for future reliance by litigants in
the same court.
The rule change proposed as a constitutional necessity by the
Anastasoff panel would have an additional consequence if adopted
as a general proposition by other courts. It would necessarily
increase the volume of published opinions required for
reproduction on paper or inclusion in online form by requiring that
all opinions retain precedential value. The Anastasoff court
rejected the relationship between publication in any particular
format and citation rules, of course.6 But, in fact, there would be a
consequence implicating the future of printed decisions. Unless
legal publishers would be willing to expand use of paper
publication or to publish incomplete sets of judicial decisions, the
demise of printed media as vehicles for disseminating judicial
decisions would be rapidly hastened. Even though unpublished
opinions now typically are much shorter than at least more
significant published opinions, courts would likely have to
increase their work to accommodate the need for greater
explication and precision in their decisionmaking. Thus, opinions
previously targeted for nonpublication would likely become longer
as the judges and their staffs labor to bring them up to the
standards imposed for publication of opinions.
Even in the short run, the rule change would likely have
dramatic consequences. Disposition time-the time between
submission of the case and issuance of the ruling and supporting
opinion-would likely increase as a result of the need to ensure
the quality of reasoning and writing in all opinions. This delay
itself would not preclude print publication, but it would make
printing of all decisions more time-consuming and costly. As
reporter subscriptions decline in response to the availability of
other vehicles for legal research, the increased cost and some
delay in publication of all decisions would tilt the playing field
even further toward reliance on online sources, whether offered by
commercial concerns or courts themselves, and toward
discontinuance of publication of printed reporters.68
67. 223 F.3d at 903: "We do not mean to suggest that the Framers expected or intended the
publication (in the sense of being printed in a book) of all opinions. For the Framers, limited
publication of judicial opinions was the rule, and they never drew that practice into question."
68. The last publishing authority for printed reports will undoubtedly be the United States
Supreme Court, whose written opinions undoubtedly will continue to be published by the
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For the profession, this loss of the paper alternative will
likely stress most counsel advanced in age who dislike the use of
computers. But the change will force the entire profession to
adjust its sense of trust.69 Reality tells us that online data can be
changed without notice, something not true about a printed
document.0 Lawyers and courts will eventually accept online
sources as beyond reproach, even though we know this is
technically not true. This reality is a consequence of technological
advances encroaching on established custom in practice, but it is
one that will not be avoidable for practitioners or courts.
CONCLUSION
Anastasoff may be seen in two starkly different contexts.
First, it clearly represents one vision of constitutional necessity, as
expressed in Judge Arnold's opinion for the Eighth Circuit panel.
In this view, the change in citation rules is dictated by the historic
power of the Constitution, as contemporarily applied, to mandate
Government Printing Office for some time after all other reporters have been discontinued. For
an interesting history of publication of legal opinions and transformation of legal research by
development of online dissemination and other means of compilation, such as CD-ROM
technology, see Lynn Foster & Bruce Kennedy, Technological Developments in Legal
Research, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 275 (2000).
69. A leading academic law librarian has reflected on the role of technology in
changing our traditions and methods in thinking like lawyers. See Robert C. Berring, Legal
Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 305 (2000).
Professor Berring issues a call for "a new Blackstone" in his essay to "reconceptualize the
law, legal categories, and legal education" to ensure that we retain human control over
information and its use in the legal system. Id. at 317-18.
70. For instance, when an opinion published in print format is withdrawn, a notice of the
court's action will typically follow. In the online context, such a notice of withdrawal can be
removed. See e.g. Powell v. State, 906 P.2d 765, 1995 WL 425027 (Okla. Crim. App. July 14,
1995). In an earlier online version of Powell, the court noted that its prior opinion, published at
902 P.2d 1119 in the advance sheets had been withdrawn and would be republished with a later
opinion. In the later opinion, the court indicated that rehearing had been granted. 906 P.2d at
784. It explained its rationale for granting rehearing while not granting relief, noting that it did
so to "correct an omission in the Court's opinion." Id. The online report was altered to reflect
publication of the revised opinion which will appear in the bound volume. See 1995 WL
425027 and 1995 WL 559633. Not only does online publication offer the potential for altering
the court's publication decision, but an opinion only appearing online can later be simply
deleted in its entirety. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Redefining Rehearing: "Previewing" Appellate
Decisions Online, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 435, 441 n. 17 (2000) (noting withdrawal of
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' initial opinion in Dodd v. State, 1999 OK CR 29, 1999
WL 521976 and its non-availability on either the Oklahoma courts' Web site or through the
online private service provided by Westlaw).
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the result. The practical consequence of this view, however, is that
some litigants-typically appellants-will be confronted by a
substantial body of unfavorable law that has traditionally not been
a necessary factor in the decisionmaking process. For their
counsel, the requirement that unpublished decisions be researched
and then, disclosed and distinguished, if possible, will simply add
to counsel's workload in rendering effective assistance without
appreciably improving the client's chances on appeal.
The second view is entirely different. In this view, a change
in both publication and citation rules will be dictated by
technological developments. The publication vehicle for
dissemination of all decisions is readily available: online
publication. Because it is available, the publish/do-not-publish
designation has lost some sense of rational, if not moral, authority.
The availability of opinions not designated for publication
undermines judicial credibility in suggesting that for some well-
defined reason, these accessible judicial expressions do not
warrant the faith of the very courts that have issued them. The
continuing rationale for not publishing, and thus, not permitting
citation, is corrupted by the implicit notion that there is something
flawed about these decisions and their supporting opinions that
warrants their designation as second-class products of the
appellate decisionmaking process.
Those courts that currently do not permit the online
publication of their unpublished opinions-a posture certainly
consistent with the not-for-publication determination-also risk
the suggestion that there is something inherently unworthy about
part of their work. The determination can no longer be grounded
in notions of economic value in keeping access to the body of the
law affordable or usable. Sooner or later, enterprising publishers
will likely find a way to acquire and publish, online, even those
judicial opinions that courts have not released for online
publication. Once that happens, an emerging market in this type of
information will press courts to make their work available.
In the long run, it is likely that considerations of
availability and access that will prove most challenging to courts
insistent on no-citation rules, rather than agreement that the
judicial power accorded by Article III has been usurped by the
federal courts in their rulemaking function. At some point, the
questions posed here will be addressed and resolved, probably
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by decisions that will first appear online, but not carrying the
notation "Not for publication." The unresolved issue is whether
they will carry a different notation: "Not suitable for citation."

